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Abstract. Security is a two dimensional problem that involves technical as well as 
social challenges. In the development of security-critical applications, system 
developers must consider both the technical and the social parts. To achieve this, 
security issues must be considered during the whole development life-cycle of an 
information system. This paper presents an approach that allows developers to 
consider both the social and the technical dimensions of security through a structured 
and well defined process. In particular, the proposed approach takes the high-level 
concepts and modelling activities of the secure Tropos methodology and enriches 
them with a low level security-engineering ontology and models derived from the 
UMLsec approach. A real case study from the e-commerce sector is employed to 
demonstrate the applicability of the approach. 
1 Introduction 
Security related challenges and problems fall into two categories: technical challenges, i.e. 
those related to the available technology and the infrastructure of information systems, and 
social challenges, i.e. those related to the impact of the human factor on the security of a 
system. To be able to develop secure information systems, both dimensions should be 
considered simultaneously. Consider for instance, a typical social engineering attack on 
health information systems. Social engineering is a non-technical kind of intrusion that 
relies on human interaction and involves tricking other people (doctors, or nurses in the 
case of medical records) to break normal security procedures. A private detective (or 
someone interested in obtaining personal health information) calls in a health professional’s 
office or a hospital, introduces herself as a doctor in an emergency hospital and asks 
information about the medical record of a particular patient [22]. This example shows that 
considering only the technical dimension of security, will not produce the desirable output.  
To enable developers to deal with both dimensions, research has shown that security 
should not be considered in isolation but within the context of the development process 
employed to develop the system [7][13][16][8]. However, it has remained true over the last 
30 years, since the seminal paper [16], that no coherent and complete methodology to 
ensure security in the construction of large general-purpose systems exists yet, in spite of 
very active research and many useful results addressing particular subgoals [17], as well as 
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a large body of security engineering knowledge accumulated [1]. In contrast, today ad hoc 
development leads to many deployed systems that do not satisfy important security 
requirements. Thus a sound methodology supporting secure systems development is 
needed. Such a methodology should take into account not only the technical problems but 
also the social dimension of developing secure information systems. 
Our goal is to work towards the development of such methodology. This paper presents 
an approach for modelling secure information systems, which takes the high-level concepts 
and modelling activities of the secure Tropos methodology [3] and enriches them with a 
low level security-engineering ontology and models derived from the UMLsec [11] 
approach. More concretely, we present an approach that integrates two complementing 
security-oriented approaches: secure Tropos and UMLsec. Section 2 provides an overview 
of secure Tropos and UMLSec, and section 3 discusses their integration. Section 4 
illustrates the enhanced framework with the aid of a use case, and section 5 concludes the 
paper.  
2 An overview of secure Tropos and UMLsec  
Secure Tropos [13][14] is a security-oriented extension of the well known1 Tropos 
methodology. Tropos provides support for four phases [3]: Early Requirements Analysis, 
aimed at defining and understanding a problem by studying its existing organizational 
setting; Late Requirements Analysis, conceived to define and describe the system-to-be, in 
the context of its operational environment; Architectural Design, that deals with the 
definition of the system global architecture in terms of subsystems; and the Detailed Design 
phase, aimed at specifying each architectural component in further detail, in terms of 
inputs, outputs, control and other relevant information.  
Secure Tropos introduces security related concepts to the Tropos methodology, to enable 
developers to consider security issues throughout the development of information systems. 
A security constraint is defined as a restriction related to security issues, such as privacy, 
integrity, and availability, which can influence the analysis and design of the information 
system under development by restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting 
with some of the requirements of the system, or by refining some of the system’s objectives 
[13]. Additionally, secure Tropos defines secure dependencies. A secure dependency 
introduces security constraint(s) that must be fulfilled for the dependency to be satisfied 
[14]. Secure Tropos uses the term secure entity to describe any goals and tasks related to 
the security of the system. A secure goal represents the strategic interests of an actor with 
respect to security. Secure goals are mainly introduced in order to achieve possible security 
constraints that are imposed to an actor or exist in the system. However, a secure goal does 
not particularly define how the security constraints can be achieved, since alternatives can 
be considered. The precise definition of how the secure goal can be achieved is given by a 
secure task.  A secure task is defined as a task that represents a particular way for satisfying 
a secure goal.  
UMLsec is an extension of UML [15] for secure systems development. Recurring 
security requirements, such as secrecy, integrity, and authenticity are offered as 
specification elements by the UMLsec extension. These properties and its associated 
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semantics are used to evaluate UML diagrams of various kinds and indicate possible 
security vulnerabilities. One can thus verify that the desired security requirements, if 
fulfilled, enforce a given security policy. One can also ensure that the requirements are 
actually met by the given UML specification of the system. UMLsec encapsulates 
knowledge on prudent security engineering and thereby makes it available to developers 
who may not be experts in security. The extension is given in form of a UML profile using 
the standard UML extension mechanisms. Stereotypes are used together with tags to 
formulate security requirements and assumptions on the system environment. Constraints 
give criteria that determine whether the requirements are met by the system design, by 
referring to a precise semantics mentioned below. 
The tags defined in UMLsec represent a set of desired properties. For instance, 
“freshness” of a value means that an attacker can not guess what its value was. Moreover, 
to represent a profile of rules that formalise the security requirements, the following are 
some of the stereotypes that are used: «critical», «high», «integrity», «internet», 
«encrypted», «LAN», «secrecy», and «secure links». The definition of the stereotypes 
allows for model checking and tool support. As an example consider secure links. This 
stereotype is used to ensure that security requirements on the communication are met by the 
physical layer. More precisely, when attached to a UML subsystem, the constraint enforces 
that for each dependency d with stereotype { }>><<>><<>><<∈ high,integrity,secrecys  
between subsystems or objects on different nodes, according to each of the above 
stereotypes, there shall be no possibilities of an attacker reading, or having any kind of 
access to the communication, respectively.  A detailed explanation of the tags and 
stereotypes defined in UMLsec can be found in [11]. The extension has been developed 
based on experiences on the model-based development of security-critical systems in 
industrial projects involving German government agencies and major banks, insurance 
companies, smart card and car manufacturers, and other companies. There have been 
several applications of UMLsec in industrial development projects.  
3 Integration of secure Tropos and UMLsec 
There are various reasons for selecting secure Tropos and UMLsec from the large number 
of different existing methodologies and modelling languages. Secure Tropos considers the 
social dimension of security as well as the high-level technical dimension of it. Firstly, an 
analysis regarding social aspects of security takes place in which the security requirements 
of the stakeholders, users and the environment of the system are analysed and identified. 
Then, the methodology continues to a more technical dimension by considering the system 
and identifying its secure requirements, and allowing developers to identify the architecture 
of their systems with respect to the identified requirements. However, the developers of the 
methodology do not focus on the detailed security specification of each component of the 
system. The UMLsec approach is on the other side of the spectrum. It does not consider the 
social dimension, since the only analysis that it offers at the early stages of the development 
(stages at which the social issues are introduced) is use case diagrams, which do not 
consider the social security requirements of the system’s stakeholders. We believe that 
integrating these two approaches will lead us to a complementary approach for secure 
information systems development, which will consider the two dimensions of security. In 
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particular, we have identified individual strengths of such integration, which indicate what 
makes each of these approaches suitable for our purpose, as well as combinational 
strengths, which indicate why these two approaches are suitable for integration. 
Individually, secure Tropos considers security issues throughout the development stage, 
from the early requirements analysis down to implementation. Moreover, it allows 
developers not only to identify security issues but also reason about them, and it provides a 
security pattern language to assist developers without much security knowledge to 
specification the architecture of the system according to its security requirements. On the 
other hand, UMLsec encapsulates established rules of prudent security engineering in the 
context of widely known notations, and thus makes them available to developers without 
extensive training in security. In addition, UMLsec supports automatic 
validation/verification of security properties. Combinational, both of the approaches are 
extensions of well-known approaches (Tropos and especially UML) and this makes the 
approach easier accessible to a large number of researchers/developers. Also, the strength 
of secure Tropos (requirements analysis) compliments the strengths of UMLsec (design) 
and vice versa, therefore providing a complete solution. In addition, the use of UML 
models during the design stage of the Tropos methodology makes the integration of secure 
Tropos and UMLsec more natural. 
As mentioned above, secure Tropos is particularly focused on the Early Requirements 
Analysis, Late Requirements Analysis, and Architectural Design, whereas for the Detailed 
Designed stage the methodology is mainly based on UML diagrams with minor extensions 
to indicate some security issues [13]. On the other hand, the strength of UMLsec can be 
found on the architectural and detailed design stages, while some weak support for late 
requirements can be introduced using use case diagrams. Therefore, the integration of the 
two methods provides a framework of particular strength throughout all the development 
stages as shown in Figure 1.  
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Fig. 1. Secure Tropos and UMLsec coverage of development phases 
However, the integration of secure Tropos and UMLsec is not straight forward and we 
had to deal with various challenges. To overcome these, a set of mapping guidelines and 
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steps were defined and the secure Tropos development process was redefined and enriched 
with extra methods and procedures.  
3.1 Mapping the secure Tropos models to UMLsec Models 
As it was mentioned above, the appropriate stage of the secure Tropos development 
process for the integration is the architectural design stage. However, different concepts 
and notations are used by secure Tropos and UMLsec. So, the first challenge involved the 
definition of a set of guidelines to map the secure Tropos analysis and early design models 
to UMLsec models. The following guidelines and steps were identified towards this 
direction.  
Guideline 1: Map the secure Tropos analysis model to UMLsec class diagram 
• Step 1. Identify the UMLsec classes: For every actor on the secure Tropos actor 
diagram a class is created on the UMLsec class diagram. In case there are sub-
actors, this is mapped into the UMLsec class diagram as an inheritance 
relationship pointing from the sub-actor class to the main actor class. 
• Step 2. Identify the operations of the UMLsec classes: The capabilities of each 
of the actors mapped into the UMLsec classes are added on the corresponding 
class as operations.  
• Step 3. Identify the attributes of the UMLsec classes: Resources related to each 
of the actors are mapped to attributes on the UMLsec diagram. This is not a 1-to-1 
mapping, meaning that a UMLsec class will not have exact the same number of 
attributes as the secure Tropos actor counterpart. The reason for this is that Tropos 
models are mainly analysis models, whereas the UMLsec model is a design model. 
Therefore, it is up to the developers to identify additional attributes according to 
the identified operations, by following the same process followed when identifying 
attributes for a class on any class diagram. 
• Step 4. Identify associations: In order to identify any associations between the 
UMLsec classes, the dependencies of the secure Tropos actor diagram are taken 
into account. Each dependency might provide an association. However, this is not 
a strict rule, and in fact in some cases developers will identify one association for a 
number of dependencies. This is again due to the reason that secure Tropos models 
are analysis and UMLsec are design so they contain more information. 
• Step 5. Identify UMLsec stereotypes: UMLsec stereotypes are identified through 
the secure dependencies. The type of the secure dependency indicates whether an 
actor is critical for the security of the system or not. Actors are considered critical 
when a security constraint is imposed to them. The classes corresponding to 
critical actors are indicated with the <<critical>> stereotype. 
 
Guideline 2: Map the secure Tropos analysis model to UMLsec deployment 
diagram 
The actor diagrams of the secure Tropos methodology contain two types of actors, 
external and internal, without differentiate between them. However, in UMLsec 
deployment diagrams, nodes and components need to be defined together with their 
communications and any security related stereotypes. The following steps are defined: 
• Step 1. Identify UMLsec nodes and components: Define at least one “user” 
and one “system” nodes. A “user” node represents one or more external actors 
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of the system, whereas the “system” node represents the system. External actors 
should be modelled as components on the appropriate “user” node, whereas 
system’s internal actors must be modelled as components of the “system” node. 
• Step 2. Mode of communication: Identify the mode of communication 
between the different nodes and use UMLsec stereotypes to denote that mode. 
For example, if the internet is used as the mode of communication between user 
node X and system node Y, then the <<internet>> UMLsec stereotype should 
be employed to denote that communication.   
• Step 3. Identify the necessary security stereotypes: Consider the security 
constraints from the secure Tropos model. At least one UMLsec stereotype 
should be identified for each security constraints. It should be noted that the 
mapping is not one-to-one, meaning that more than one stereotypes will, 
usually, result from one security constraint.     
3.2 The new process 
In a nutshell, the redefined secure Tropos process, allows developers initially to employ 
secure Tropos concepts and modelling activities to identify and analyse the security 
requirements of the system-to-be. Then, a combination of secure Tropos and UMLsec is 
employed to determine a suitable architecture for the system with respect to the identified 
security requirements, and identify the components of the system along with their secure 
capabilities, protocols, and properties. During the last stage UMLsec is used to specify in 
detail the components, which were identified in the previous stage, with respect to security. 
In particular, during the Early Requirements Analysis the security needs of the 
stakeholders are analysed and a set of security constraints are imposed to the actors that 
satisfy the identified security needs. Moreover, security goals and entities are identified, for 
each of the participating actors, to satisfy the imposed security constraints. To achieve this, 
developers employ a set of different, but related, modelling activities defined by secure 
Tropos and its diagrammatic notations, such as actor’s and the goal diagrams [13]. During 
the Late Requirements Analysis, the security requirements of the system are identified 
taking into account the security needs of the stakeholders as well as their security 
constraints (identified during the analysis of the previous stage). The output of this stage 
will be the definition of the system’s security requirements together with a set of security 
constraints, along with the system’s security goals and entities that allow the satisfaction of 
the security requirements of the system. 
The main aim of the Architectural Design is to define the architecture of the system with 
respect to its security requirements. To achieve this, initially secure Tropos notation 
together with a set of security patterns [13] are used to determine the general architecture 
and the components of the system, then the secure Tropos models are mapped to UMLsec 
models and in particular UMLsec Class and Deployment diagrams. These are used to 
model the security protocols and properties of the architecture.   
During Detailed design, UMLsec is used to specify in detail the components of the 
system identified in the previous stage. For this reason, UMLsec activity diagrams are used 
to define explicitly the security of the components, UMLsec sequence diagrams are used to 
model the secure interactions of the system’s components. For example, to determine if 
cryptographic session keys exchanged in a key exchanged protocol remain confidential in 
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view of possible adversaries. UMLsec statechart diagrams are used to specify the security 
issues on the resulting sequences of states and the interaction with the component’s 
environment. Figure 2 illustrates the redefined development process. Highlighted in red are 
the new activities resulted from the integration of the two approaches.   
4 Case Study  
To demonstrate our approach, we employ a case study from the e-commerce domain: 
The Common Electronic Purse System (CEPS) [4]. CEPS proposes the use of stored value 
smart cards, called electronic purses or CEP cards, to allow cash-free point-of-sale (POS) 
transactions offering more fraud protection than credit cards2.  
 
Stage: Early Requirements
Activity: Stakeholders Analysis
Activity: Security Constraints Analysis
Activity: Secure Entities Analysis
Stage: Late Requirements
Activity: System Analysis
Activity: System Security Constraints Analysis
Activity: System Secure Entities Analysis
Stage: Architectural Design
Activity: General System Architecture
Activity: Secure Tropos Models to UMLSec
Activity: Modelling of Security Protocols 
Activity: Modelling of Security properties of Architecture
Stage: Detailed Design
Activity: Definition of Components
Activity: UMLSec explicit definition of Security Components 
Activity: modelling of Secure Interactions of Secure Components
Activity: Automatic Verification
 
Fig. 2. The redefined development process 
 
Amongst others, the following participants are defined in a CEP transaction [4]: the 
Scheme Provider, The authority responsible for establishing an infrastructure for the 
overall functionality and security of the CEP system and enforcing the operating rules and 
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 Credit card numbers are valid until the card is stopped, enabling misuse. In contrast, electronic 
purses can perform cryptographic operations which allow transaction-bound authentication. 
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regulations of the scheme; the card Issuer, the organisation responsible for the provision 
and distribution of smart cards containing a CEP application (electronic purses), and the 
management of the funds pool; the Cardholder, the person who uses the card for making 
purchases; the Load Acquirer, the entity responsible for establishing business relationships 
with one or more scheme providers to process load and currency exchange transactions, and 
settle unlinked transactions; the Merchant, who is responsible for the use of a POS device 
to accept CEP cards for payment of goods and services; the Merchant Acquirer, the entity 
responsible for establishing a business relationship with one or more scheme providers to 
process POS transactions, and settle POS transactions. Moreover, the merchant acquirer is 
responsible for the provision and distribution of Purchase Secure Application Modules 
(PSAMs) that interact with terminals for conducting transactions at the point of sale.    
4.1 Early Requirements 
Initially, the main actors of the system are identified together with their dependencies 
and their security constraints. In particular, a CEP based transaction, although it provides 
many advantages, over a cash transaction, for both the buyer and the merchant; it is much 
more complex. In a normal operating scenario of the CEPS scheme, the Cardholder loads 
his/her card with money. During the post-transaction settlement, the Load Acquirer sends 
the money to the relevant Card Issuer. The Cardholder buys a product from a Merchant 
using his/her card. In the settlement, the Merchant receives the corresponding amount of 
money from the Card Issuer. It is worth mentioning that card issuers can take on the roles 
of load acquirers. As shown in Figure 3, the Merchant depends on the Buyer (known as the 
cardholder on the CEP scheme) to pay using the CEP Card, on the CEP Scheme Provider 
to provide the cash free transaction infrastructure and on the Card Issuer to collect the 
money.  
  
Fig. 3. Actor diagram of the CEP System 
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On the other hand, the Buyer depends on the Card Issuer to obtain a CEP enabled card, 
on the Load Acquirer to load the card and on the CEP Scheme Provider for convenient cash 
free shopping. As part of these dependencies, security related constraints are introduced, 
imposed by the different actors and the environment [13]. For instance, the Buyer imposes 
to the Card Issuer the Allow use only from authorised cardholder security constraint as part 
of the Obtain CEP Card dependency. In turn, and in order to satisfy this constraint, the 
Card Issuer imposes two security constraints, one to the Buyer (sign receipt of card) and 
one to the Merchant (Display evidence of transaction). On the other hand, the Merchant, to 
satisfy the security constraint imposed by the Card Issuer, imposes two security constraints 
to the Buyer (sign proof of purchase) and the CEP Scheme Provider (Keep infrastructure 
secure). Apart from defining the dependencies and the security constraints of these 
dependencies, secure Tropos allows developers to analyse each actor internally3. 
4.2 Late Requirements analysis 
During the late requirements analysis, the system is introduced as another actor who has a 
number of dependencies with the existing actors, and it accepts a number of responsibilities 
delegated to it by the other actors. For instance, for the CEP case study, the CEP Scheme 
Provider delegates the responsibility for administering the CEP transactions to the CEP 
System, whereas the Merchant delegates the CEP transaction resource to the CEP System. 
With respect to security, since dependencies are delegated from the actors to the CEP 
System, possible security constraints regarding those dependencies are also delegated. In 
our case study, the CEP Scheme Provider actor together with the administer CEP 
transactions goal, delegates the Keep transactions secure security constraint on the CEP 
system actor. This means, that the CEP System is responsible now for satisfying that 
security constraint.   
On the other hand, the introduction of the CEP system introduces new dependencies 
between the system and the existing actors. For example, the CEP System depends on the 
Merchant to get information regarding the transactions, such as the product information, the 
amount and so on. The CEP System also depends on the Buyer to get payment details such 
as the Buyer’s card and account number. Moreover, these new dependencies impose extra 
security constraints on the CEP System. For instance, the Buyer wants their payment details 
to remain private so a security constraint is imposed to the CEP System from the Buyer as 
part of the Get Payment Details secure dependency. Similarly, the Merchant imposes a 
security constraint on the CEP System for the Get Transaction Information secure 
dependency.  
However, at this stage, the security constraints are defined in a high level which makes it 
impossible (and impractical) to truly understand the security implications of the imposed 
security constraints to the CEP System. Moreover, the system itself has not been defined in 
such a detail that it can allow developers to further analyse the security constraints. 
Therefore, the next step involves the internal analysis of the CEP system actors following 
the same analysis techniques used during the early requirements stage. 
                                                          
3
 Due to lack of space we do not illustrate in this paper the internal analysis of the actors. The 
modelling activities used for this can be found in [13]. 
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Due to lack of space, we focus our analysis for the rest of the case study to a central part 
of the CEP System, the purchase transaction. This is an off-line protocol that allows 
cardholders to use their electronic CEP card to pay for products. The internal analysis of 
the system for the purchase transaction results in the identification of the following main 
goals of the system:  process transaction data, store transaction data, adjust credit 
balance, display transaction details and provide proof of transaction. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Actor diagram including the CEP System 
From the security point of view, secure goals are identified to satisfy the security 
constraints imposed initially from the other actors to the system. Moreover, the internal 
analysis of the system helps to identify security constraints that were not identified during 
the previous analysis or define in more details some existing security constraints. For 
instance, the Keep transactions secure security constraint imposed by the CEP Scheme 
Provider to the CEP System can now (that the system’s goals have been identified) further 
defined. For example, related to the purchase transaction, the Keep transaction secure 
security constraint can be further refined to constraints such as keep transaction private, 
keep transaction available and keep integrity of the transaction. These security constraints 
introduce more security constraints on the system such as obtain user’s authorisation 
details, authenticate all transactions and so on. When all the goals, secure goals, entities 
and secure entities have been identified, the next stage of the process is the architectural 
design.  
4.3 Architectural Design 
During the architectural design, the architecture of the system is defined with respect to 
its security requirements, and potential sub-actors are identified and the responsibility for 
the satisfaction of the system’s goals and secure goals is delegated to these actors. 
11 
Furthermore, the interactions of the newly identified sub-actors and the existing actors of 
the system are specified. In our case study, the sub-actors of the system, related to the 
purchase transaction, are the Point-Of-Sale (POS) Device, the Purchase Security 
Application Module (PSAM), and the Display. Therefore, these actors are delegated 
responsibility for the system’s goals (such as Adjust Credit Balance, Process Transaction 
Data and Display Transaction Details) and secure goals (such as Perform Integrity Checks, 
Ensure Data Availability and Perform Cryptographic Procedures).  Moreover, this process 
allows developers to identify security constraints that could not be identified earlier in the 
development process. For instance, the Merchant and the Buyer now depend on the POS 
Device to deliver the resource Proof of Transaction. However, both these actors impose, as 
part of the Proof Transaction dependency, the security constraint tamper resistant to the 
POS Device. The Buyer imposes that constraint because he/she does not want to be charged 
more than the transaction amount, and the Merchant because he/she wants to make sure 
they will get the money displayed on the transaction. On the other hand, the POS Device 
actor, in turn, imposes that security constraint to the other actors involved with the resource 
proof of transaction, i.e. the PSAM and the Display. Therefore, security goals are 
introduced to the PSAM and the Display to satisfy the tamper resistant security constraint.  
Moreover, a new actor is identified that interacts with the system, the CEP Card. In 
particular, the Buyer depends on the CEP Card actor to pay for goods. However, the Buyer 
imposes two security constraints to the CEP Card actor, to verify the transaction and to be 
tamper-resistant. Therefore, secure goals are identified for the CEP Card actor to satisfy 
these two security constraints. When all the security constraints and secure goals have been 
identified the next step in the development process involves the use of UMLsec to define 
more precisely some of the security related attributes of the identified actors. As indicated 
in Section 3.1 the first step on this process is to map the Secure Tropos analysis model to 
the UMLsec class diagram. Following the first four steps described in section 3.1 the UML 
classes are identified as shown in Figure 5.  
 
Fig. 5. Partial UMLSec diagram for the presented case study 
In particular, as our analysis has shown, the participants involved in the off-line purchase 
transaction protocol are the customer's card and the merchant's POS device. The POS 
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device contains a Purchase Security Application Module (PSAM) that is used to store new                                                          
and processed data. As indicated in our analysis, the PSAM is required to be tamper-
resistant. Moreover, following step 5 of our guidelines, UMLSec stereotypes are identified. 
For example, the sessions keys SK on the PSAM object are required to be fresh, therefore 
this is indicated using the {fresh} tag of UMLsec (see section 2 for {fresh}). 
Following the steps of the second guideline provided in section 3.1, the deployment 
diagram of figure 6 is constructed. To satisfy the security constraint tamper resistant, 
identified during the previous stage, for the PSAM, the Display and the POS device, the 
communication link between the PSAM and the Display is secured. As shown in this 
diagram, this is achieved by using a smart card with an integrated display as the PSAM. 
Furthermore, to satisfy the rest of the security constraints of our analysis, our design makes 
sure that the PSAM cannot be replaced without being noticed.  
 
Fig. 6. Deployment diagram of the case study 
4.4 Detailed Design 
The next step on the development involves the detailed design of each of the system 
components. During this stage each of the components identified in the previous stages is 
further specified by means of Statechart Diagrams, Activity Diagrams, and Sequence 
Diagrams4. Moreover, the UMLsec stereotypes allow us to specify the security constraints 
linked to the information flow and the processes carried out by the components.  
UMLsec sequence diagrams are used to specify the security issues on the resulting 
sequences of states and the interaction with the component’s environment. As an example, 
consider the following diagram for the purchase protocol: 
At the beginning of its execution in the POS device, the PSAM creates a transaction 
number NT with value 0. Before each protocol run, NT is incremented. If a certain limit is 
exceeded, the PSAM stops functioning, to avoid rolling over of NT to 0. Note that here we 
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 Due to lack of space we illustrate only sequence diagrams. 
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assume an additional operation, the +, to build up expressions. The protocol between the 
Card C, the PSAM P, and the Display D starts after the Card C is inserted into a POS 
device containing P and D and after the amount M is communicated to the PSAM by typing 
it into a terminal assumed to be secure. Each protocol run consists of the parallel execution 
of the card's and the PSAM's part of the protocol. Both check the validity of the received 
certificate. If all the verifications succeed, the protocol finishes, otherwise the execution of 
the protocol stops at the failed verification. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. UMLSec sequence diagram for the purchase protocol 
4.5 Discussion 
The original CEPS specification requires the CEP card and the PSAM to be tamper-
proof but not the POS device. This, leads to the following weakness with respect to 
security. The POS device is not secure against a potential attacker who may try to betray the 
Merchant, for example some of his/her employees, by replacing the PSAM and 
manipulating the Display. The idea of the attack is that the attacker redirects the messages 
between the Card C and the PSAM P to another PSAM P’, for example with the goal of 
buying electronic content and let the cardholder pay for it. We assume that the attacker 
manages to have the amount payable to P’ equal the amount payable to P. The attacker also 
sends the required message to the display which will then reassure the merchant that he has 
received the required amount.  
In our design such attack will fail. Our analysis and design improves the initial CEPS 
specification by securing the communication link between the PSAM and the Display, and 
by making sure that the PSAM cannot be replaced without being noticed. This will 
guarantee that the Display cannot anymore be manipulated, which means that if the PSAM 
received less money than expected, it would be noticed immediately.  
5 Conclusions  
Because of their wide-spread use in security-critical applications, information systems 
have to be secure. Unfortunately, the current state of the art in the development of security-
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critical information systems is far from satisfactory. A sound methodology to consider the 
technical as well as the social dimension of security is needed.  
Towards this goal, we have presented the integration of two prominent approaches to the 
development of secure information systems: secure Tropos and UMLsec. The main feature 
of our proposal is the integration of the strong parts of each of these approaches, namely the 
socially oriented part of the secure Tropos methodology and the technical part of the 
UMLsec. This achieves several goals. First of all, developers are able to consider security 
both as a social aspect as well as a technical aspect. As it was argued in the introduction, 
this is important when developing information systems. Secondly, the approach allows the 
definition of security requirements in different levels and as a result it provides better 
integration with the modelling of the system’s functionality. Thirdly, security is not 
considered in isolation but simultaneously with the rest of the system requirements. 
Fourthly, the integration allows the consideration of the organisational environment for the 
modelling of security issues, by facilitating the understanding of the security needs in terms 
of the security policy and the real security needs of the stakeholders, and then it allows the 
transformation of the security requirements to a design that is amenable to formal 
verification with the aid of automatic tools. It is worth mentioning at this point, that 
advance tool support is provided to assist with our approach [10]. The developed tool can 
be used to check the constraints associated with UMLsec stereotypes mechanically, and it 
uses analysis engines, such as model-checkers and automated theorem provers. The results 
of the analysis are given back to the developer, together with a modified UMLsec model, 
where the weaknesses that were found are highlighted. There is also a framework for 
implementing verification routines for the constraints associated with the UMLsec 
stereotypes.  
To demonstrate the practical applicability and usefulness of our approach we have 
applied it to the CEP case study. The results are promising since our analysis in fact 
improves the security of the system. 
A large number of research efforts related to our work has been presented in the 
literature [2][5][6][8][9][12][19][23]. However, our work is different in two main points. 
Existing work is mainly focused either on the technical or the social aspect of considering 
security, and presented approaches applicable only to certain development stages. In 
contrast our approach considers security as a two dimensional problem, where the technical 
dimension depends on the social dimension. Moreover, our approach is applicable to stages 
from the early requirements to implementation.  
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